DNDO wants to develop a “global nuclear detection architecture”

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is worried that it might be losing sight of the forest because of all the trees.

Rather than get lost in the development of individual devices intended to detect a possible nuclear attack by terrorists, the DNDO wants to step back and do some “big thinking” about the federal government’s overall architecture – or perhaps the lack thereof – for a “system-of-systems” approach to thwarting a deadly nuclear attack.

“Although the office’s work is often seen as focused on detectors narrowly (i.e., devices), its responsibilities are actually broader,” explained the DHS office, in an online sources sought notice it posted on July 13. “Nuclear detection, after all, is a system problem.”

DNDO noted that there are least five different federal programs which play a role in defending the global supply chain against a nuclear threat:

• The Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is managed by the Department of Energy;
•  The Second Line of Defense (SLD) program, which includes the Megaports program and is also run by DoE;
• The Container Security Initiative which is operated by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a unit of DHS;
• The Radiation Portal Monitoring System, which is also run by CBP;
• The Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection (PRND) program, which is operated by several state and local law enforcement organizations.

DNDO acknowledged that it is big challenge to keep all these federal agencies coordinated before an attack, and it would become even more difficult after an attack.

“Adding to these challenges, DNDO must be concerned about the near, mid, and long term threats, which implies the need to invest in a mixture of R&D activities to develop new systems, including potentially game-changing (transformational) systems, acquisition, and engineering and honing of current capabilities,” explained the notice.

To help it get a grip on the big picture, DNDO is considering awarding a contract to a vendor that could help it assess these system-of-systems issues related to the “Global Nuclear-Detection Architecture,” and develop a measurable baseline as well alternative technical approaches.

An outside firm would be given a one-year performance period to put together an “analytic structure” to help DNDO think through these complex issues.

Further information is available from Richard Passow, the contracting officer’s technical representative, at 202-254-7445 or richard.passow@dhs.gov.

Input from interested parties is due by July 27.